

RECENT BALKAN ALIGNMENTS

by

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INTRODUCTION

AMONG the interesting political phenomena traceable in part to the world economic depression has been the recent speeding-up of a movement for closer co-operation among the Balkan states of South-eastern Europe. Long a byword because of their weakness, their mutual hostility and their liability to exploitation by the stronger nations of Europe, the Balkan countries have been driven by the economic calamities of recent times to consider all possible means of extricating themselves from a position whose gravity is apparent to all. A series of agricultural conferences held in various cities of Central and Southeastern Europe since last midsummer has given some of the Balkan countries reason to hope that their economic condition may be improved greatly through consistent international cooperation, and especially through rationalization of production and marketing and through international provision for rural credits. An even more comprehensive program of co-operation, intellectual, social and political, as well as agricultural and industrial, was outlined, moreover, at a purely Balkan conference held at Athens last October, and attended by delegations from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Jugoslavia, Rumania and Turkey.

These six countries, covering an area equal to that of France and Italy combined, and supporting a population about one and one-tenth times as large as that of France,¹

1. A sufficiently accurate impression of areas and populations of individual Balkan states may be derived from the following statistics and estimates, quoted in *The Statesman's Year-Book, 1930*:

	Area (in square miles)	Population
Albania	17,374	833,519
Bulgaria	39,814	5,596,800
Greece	49,912	6,204,684
Jugoslavia	96,134	13,290,000
Rumania	122,282	17,393,149
Turkey-in-Europe	9,256*	1,044,306*

*Figures for the whole country, including Asiatic and European Turkey (1927) are as follows: Area, 762,736 square km. (294,491 square miles); population, 13,660,274. Cf. Turkey, Office Central de Statistique, *Population de la Turquie* (Angora, Imprimerie Turkodjak, 1928).

have presented since the war a series of rather difficult political problems. Some of the major issues which troubled this area before 1928 were reviewed in a former number of the *Information Service*.² Many of them grew out of the redistribution of territory effected by the peace treaties. Among the more prolific causes of trouble have been (a) the failure on the part of some of the inhabitants to transfer their moral allegiance from the old to the new governments; (b) the policy adopted by various governments of forcing assimilation upon their newly acquired populations; (c) disputes over the liquidation of properties abandoned by refugees fleeing from one country to another; and (d) the persistence of nationalist sentiment in regions whose claim to separate national existence was disallowed at the Peace Conference. Moreover, economic adjustments have been hard to make, and the task of satisfying claims by inland communities for use of and access to seaports has not yet been completed.

The continued existence of half a dozen relatively undeveloped states in so restricted a region as the Balkan peninsula has meant that the pre-war weakness of these states has persisted, bringing in its train the familiar evils of mutual jealousy, mutual distrust, and a tendency to look to rival European powers for a bolstering-up of conflicting claims within the Balkans. Moreover, the habit of contracting special alliances, usually suspected by rival states to be of a quasi-offensive nature, has been a growing practice in the Balkans. The possibility of a flare-up in this region has seldom been absent from the imagination of Europeans generally, while the Balkan peoples themselves are conscious of a danger that their

2. "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. IV, No. 12, August 17, 1928. For a more extended description of recent historical backgrounds cf. H. F. Armstrong, *The New Balkans*, (New York, Harpers, 1926).

own countries may be precipitated into another serious war through the rivalries of the more powerful states with whom they have contracted alliances, thus repeating the unhappy experiences of July-August 1914.

The First Balkan Conference of 1930 was an attempt on the part of responsible citizens to introduce a less dangerous and wasteful régime in the peninsula. To appreciate

the contemporary situation it is necessary to examine (a) the ideas dominating the conference, (b) practical developments which have taken place within recent years in respect to treaty alignments within the Balkans and (c) the general nature of the influence exerted in the peninsula by outside powers. These three topics are accordingly discussed in succession in the present report.

THE FIRST BALKAN CONFERENCE

Although periodic outbursts of sentiment in favor of some form of Balkan *rapprochement* have occurred since the World War, it was not until the First Balkan Conference of October 5-12, 1930 that the initial problem of gathering representatives of Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Rumania and Turkey in a semi-official conference was solved. The influence of Greek leaders was strongly felt in the period of preparation for this conference. At the Universal Peace Congress which met in Athens in October 1929, it was chiefly through the exertions of a former Greek Prime Minister, M. Papana-stasiou, that a unanimous vote was secured in favor of commissioning the International Peace Bureau to convoke a Balkan conference at an early date. The International Peace Bureau sent communications to the six Foreign Ministers in May 1930. The Greek government then suggested that the conference should convene at Athens, and offered for its use the hall of the Greek Chamber of Deputies. The five remaining governments responded promptly to the invitation sent them by the president of the Greek Chamber and made appropriate arrangements for the appointment of delegates.³

BULGARIA RAISES MINORITY QUESTION

A week before the conference opened a sensation was created by the decision of the Bulgarian delegation not to attend, inasmuch as its members had learned that all discussions of the minority problem were to be barred.⁴ Adopting the view that any Balkan federation would be a sham if it were not

based on a just settlement of minority grievances,⁵ the Bulgarian delegation held aloof until the committee on organization of the conference explained that no questions of detail were to be discussed, but only the broadest of general principles, all other matters being left for future conferences. The Bulgarian delegation, acting on the advice of Premier Liaptcheff, accordingly reversed its decision not to attend,⁶ but insisted on airing its views on the minority question when the conference was once well under way. M. Kyroff of the Bulgarian delegation asked members of the conference to urge on their respective governments a resolution for the protection of minorities;⁷ in the general resolutions of the conference, however, the subject was mentioned only once, in a passage referring to the necessity of fulfilling treaty engagements.⁸

The resolutions adopted by the conference,⁹ while interesting in themselves, were given an importance they would not otherwise have possessed through the circumstance that, as already seen, the delegations of the six participating countries had a semi-official character and included persons of high standing in public life.¹⁰

5. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 27, 1930.

6. *Ibid.*, September 30, October 2, 1930.

7. "Whereas the problem of minorities presents one of the greatest obstacles to the realization of a Balkan entente, the First Balkan Conference declares it to be indispensable that the governments of all Balkan countries, as well as the minorities therein resident, should carry out loyally and completely their mutual undertakings in fulfillment of the minorities treaties. It hopes that the International Peace Bureau and all members of the Balkan delegations will use their influence and put forth every effort to reach this useful goal, reporting on the result of their activities at the next Balkan Conference." (*Messager d'Athènes, Journal de la première Conférence balkanique*, October 8, 1930.)

8. The conference recognized that to insure an era of peace in the Balkans it was "indispensable to give the Balkan nations supplementary guarantees of security within the cadre of existing treaties and to assure the loyal fulfillment of all other obligations arising from these treaties, including those affecting minorities."

9. Published in full in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, November 22, 1930.

10. Among them were the president of the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies, the vice president of the Grand National

3. C. Coukidis, "La première Conférence balkanique," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, December 10, 1930.

4. For Bulgaria's interest in the minority question, cf. p. 11-14.

BALKAN CONFERENCE FOUNDED AS A PERMANENT BODY

The Balkan union proposed at the Athens conference was described as a group of independent nations whose sovereignty would not be affected by their new relationship, which would exist primarily to consolidate peace. A permanent organization was to be established, to be known as the Balkan Conference. Its function would be to promote Balkan cooperation in economic, social, intellectual and political intercourse, in the hope of making a Balkan union ultimately practicable. Meeting in each of the Balkan countries in turn,¹¹ the conference would carry on its work with the assistance of appropriate groups and associations in each country. It would have at least six commissions—on organization, political cooperation, intellectual cooperation, economics, communications, and hygiene and social policy. The president of the conference would be the leader of the delegation in whose country the conference was to meet in any given year. The council of the conference would be composed of three members of each national delegation including the delegation leaders. The secretariat would be made up of a secretary-general and five other officials. The Prime Ministers of the six Balkan countries were asked to be honorary presidents of the conference; all of them accepted this courtesy in letters read at a plenary session on October 9. Finally, the six Foreign Ministers were urged in an important resolution to meet once a year in some Balkan center to exchange views on Balkan affairs.

PROGRAMS PROPOSED:

A MULTILATERAL TREATY

The reasons for advocating a Balkan union were discussed in sessions of the political commission. There was general agreement that the League Covenant and the Kellogg pact were insufficient to prevent wars; so,

Assembly at Angora, a number of senators and deputies (including a former Prime Minister of Greece), and others who were accustomed to public responsibility. Each of the governments, moreover, had an official observer at the conference; these included five diplomatic representatives at Athens and the Director-General of the Greek Foreign Office. (Observers were also named by the International Peace Bureau, the International Labour Organization, the Interparliamentary Union, the International Parliamentary Conference of Commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Union for European Customs Collaboration and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.) Saint-Brice, "La conférence balkanique," *Correspondance d'Orient*, October 1930.

11. Its next session is to be held at Istanbul in October 1931.

too, was the incomplete system of bilateral treaties which Balkan states had been encouraged to contract because of the inadequacies of existing guarantees. Accordingly, it was decided that a multilateral treaty, including all the Balkan countries, outlawing war and providing for the pacific settlement of disputes, was the logical remedy for this situation. But whether the pacific settlement of disputes should be achieved by conciliation or compulsory arbitration the conference failed to decide. One of the Greek delegates made a strong plea for the latter principle; another advocated the setting up of a conciliation commission (composed of the presidents of the Supreme Courts of the six nations), to whom political disputes would be submitted on the request of one or both parties, or on the request of three other Balkan states. Such a commission might also establish the identity of an aggressor state, it was suggested.¹²

A supplementary decision was reached in favor of a multilateral treaty of extradition and legal aid. The Council of the Balkan Conference was directed, moreover, to study the question of progressive unification of Balkan law.

INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION

The program submitted to the 1930 conference by its commission on intellectual cooperation was an elaborate one, whose importance lay in the fact that relatively few ordinary contacts have yet been established among the peoples of the Balkan countries. The items suggested by this commission included the following:

Frequent contacts between Balkan associations; the exchange of university professors and students; expositions of Balkan arts and crafts; Balkan foyers for Balkan students in dormitories of foreign universities; organization of meetings in villages to explain to the masses the points of resemblance among Balkan peoples; vacation camps for children; contact among physical culture societies; teaching of some Balkan language and its literature in the high schools and universities of each country; introduction of courses in normal schools to explain the principles of Balkan union; creation in universities of chairs of comparative Balkan law; modification of teaching generally, and especially of the teaching of history, so as to serve the cause of peace; elim-

12. For general discussions, cf. *Messager d'Athènes, Journal*, cited, October 7, 12, 1930.

ination from history texts of chapters which excite hatred or recall wars; the spread of classical humanism through the study of Greek and Latin; the translation of Balkan folklore into the various Balkan languages by competent persons; translation of modern literary and dramatic works; closer relations among societies of writers, musicians, artists and choral societies, and the celebration of a Balkan Week in all Balkan countries at a fixed date.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The principles enunciated during the discussions of the economic commission resembled in many respects the findings of the Eastern European agricultural conferences. It was pointed out that although the greater part of Balkan produce could be consumed within the Balkan peninsula, each of the Balkan countries had been exporting the major portion of its produce to outside markets. The resulting competition of Balkan sellers in other European markets had reduced the price of their products, to the natural disadvantage of Balkan producers.¹³ The suggestion was made, therefore, that Balkan countries should establish a customs convention to permit the importation of Balkan products at tariff rates lower than those granted to outside countries even under most-favored-nation clauses of existing or future treaties. An agreement concerning quantity, quality and sale price of exports to outside countries was advocated also, since by presenting a united front the Balkan states could secure better terms in the tariffs of other countries.¹⁴

The Balkan Conference in its general resolutions charged the economic section of its secretariat with the duty of studying systematically the economic problems of Balkan countries, keeping in view:

The elimination of obstacles to commerce and the transit of goods among the Balkan states; standardization of nomenclature in tariffs; the preparation of treaties to be concluded (a) among Balkan states, (b) between the Balkan states and outside nations; the possibility of establishing special Balkan tariff preferences; special measures for the protection of the Balkan tobacco industry; encouragement of cooperatives

13. In 1927, so M. A. Mylonas of the economic commission stated, Albania exported to Balkan countries only 24 per cent of its total exports, Bulgaria 18.4 per cent, Jugoslavia 10.62 per cent, Turkey 8.19 per cent, Greece 2.8 per cent, and Rumania (in 1925) 12.9 per cent.

14. For these and other suggestions offered at the conference, cf. *Messageur d'Athènes, Journal*, cited, October 7, 11, 1930.

and of collaboration between Balkan cooperative societies; the study of measures necessary for the ultimate establishment of a monetary union; cooperation of credit institutions to promote economic and financial relations among the participating countries, especially by extending bank credits; and the early conclusion of a pact of economic solidarity.

COMMUNICATIONS

The commission on communications found that a great deal of improvement was necessary in the provisions for transportation and communication among countries of the Balkan peninsula. Although direct telegraphic connections existed between some of the leading cities of the Balkans, telephonic communication was still relatively undeveloped. Railroads were few and not always conveniently placed, and the existence of narrow-gauge lines in some regions complicated a problem of transportation already difficult.¹⁵

At a plenary session on October 10 the following resolutions were adopted:

Railway communications should be developed so as to connect the various Balkan countries, and especially to link by direct and convenient routes the capitals of these countries; at least two trunk lines should be provided—one from north to south, connecting Central Europe with the Aegean Sea, and the other traversing the Balkan Peninsula from east to west by the route of the ancient *Via Egnatia*; railway rates should be standardized and shipping formalities simplified to a large extent. Pending railway construction, work should be begun on automobile roads connecting Balkan capitals with the trunk roads of Central Europe. Balkan countries should allow the ships of their Balkan neighbors the same rights as their own in respect of free navigation and of participation in coasting trade; they should encourage cooperation among shipping concerns to establish continuous routes (the line from the Adriatic through the Aegean to the Black Sea might be served by ships of all six Balkan countries), while administrations of the various ports serving Balkan countries should act in close collaboration to protect the interests of these ports in relation to Balkan trade. Air lines between Balkan countries should be exploited by Balkan capital, and advance information should be given mutually concerning projects for building airports and establishing meteorological services. Large commercial centers in the Balkans should be given direct telephone connections. A tourists' federation, with headquarters for the present at Istanbul, should

15. For statement re existing and projected roads, railroads and airlines, cf. *ibid.*, October 7, 1930.

coordinate the work of existing tourist agencies in the Balkans and arrange for appropriate propaganda in Western Europe and the United States. A special section of the Secretariat should pursue the study of how communication and points of contact between the Balkan countries might be multiplied.

BALKAN POSTAL UNION

Furthermore, it was decided that there should be established in 1931 a Balkan Postal Union, a draft convention for which was approved by the conference. Such a union would permit reduction of postal rates by 40 to 60 per cent as between Balkan countries, and would extend, speed up and regularize postal service in the peninsula. Under the proposed convention the six Balkan countries would form a single postal territory, employing stamps of the Balkan Postal Union and enjoying domestic postal rates.¹⁶

A final series of resolutions adopted by the conference concerned the interests of the laboring and peasant classes in the Balkans.

At the closing session (held at Delphi, seat of the ancient Amphictyonic League—the “Balkan Union” of the fourth century B. C.), a message to the Balkan peoples was adopted, reminding them that the independence and well-being of their countries depended on their own energy in pursuing the ideals discussed at the conference. Enthusiasm ran high, even among those delegates who had come to the conference in a spirit of skepticism.¹⁷ One of the impressive feat-

ures of the gathering was a series of international athletic competitions,¹⁸ during which a new Balkan flag was flown. Another occurrence which was warmly greeted was the decision of press representatives covering the conference to promote the formation of a Balkan Press Association which could support powerfully the project for a Balkan union.¹⁹

AGENDA PLANNED FOR SECOND CONFERENCE

The work of the Balkan Conference continued after the first delegates dispersed in mid-October. In the first week of February 1931 the preparatory committee for the Second Balkan Conference met at Salonika. One of the items it placed on the agenda for the October meeting was the discussion of a motion urging fulfillment of minorities treaties and other contractual obligations. Although the All-Bulgarian League announced a few days later that it believed existing boundaries would have to be changed to meet the “requirements of ethnological distribution” before a Balkan understanding became feasible, and although the Jugoslav government was firmly opposed to any tampering with boundaries or with minority questions, the general plans for establishing the Balkan Conference on a permanent basis proceeded fairly smoothly and attracted wide attention.²⁰

BALKAN HISTORY SINCE THE WORLD WAR

With the Balkan Conference only beginning its work on what must prove at best to be a slow process of promoting cooperation, the governments of the six states possessing territory in the Balkan peninsula still have to deal with the practical consequences of the international disputes and agreements to which they have been party.

Since the close of the Paris Peace Conference, although threats of war have occurred repeatedly, only one actual war has been fought between nations possessing territory in the Balkan peninsula. This was the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922, at the close of which peace terms affecting Turkey were redefined at Lausanne in July 1923.²¹

GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS

The seven-year period which followed the conclusion of peace at Lausanne was marked by a series of disputes between Greece and

16. *Ibid.*, October 11, 1931.

17. Cf. speech of Bulgarian delegate, M. Kyroff, reported in *Messageur d'Athènes, Journal*, cited, October 11, 1930.

18. These were especially enjoyed because international athletics in Southeastern Europe are still apt to be hampered by political considerations, as when a Jugoslav football team, scheduled to play in Budapest, was forbidden to leave by the Jugoslav Minister of the Interior because of Hungarian irredentist activity. (*New York Times*, December 18, 1929.)

19. *Messageur d'Athènes, Journal*, cited, October 10, 1930.

20. *Christian Science Monitor*, February 17, 1931; *New York Times*, December 17, 1930; *L'Europe Nouvelle*, February 7, 1931, p. 165. A donation of \$10,000 was made by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace toward the maintenance of the secretariat.

21. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vols. XXVIII, XXXII and XXXVI. For full list of agreements signed at Lausanne, cf. Elizabeth P. MacCallum, “Post-War Treaties Affecting the Near East: An Index,” F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. V, No. 14, September 18, 1929, p. 252-53 and 255. For an account of the Greco-Turkish war, cf. Toynbee and Kirkwood, *Turkey*. (New York, Scribner's, 1927), p. 92-110.

Turkey concerning the application of the convention of January 30, 1923²² for the compulsory exchange of populations. The Mixed Commission appointed to carry out the convention failed repeatedly to harmonize the views of its Turkish and Greek members, while the disposition of the two governments to take a hand in the matter added further complications to an already difficult task.

A few of the chief sources of conflict were the following:

1. Greece and Turkey disagreed on the number of non-exchangeable Greeks in Constantinople —i. e., those established in that city before October 30, 1918, who were exempted from the obligation to emigrate. In October 1924 the Turkish authorities arrested a number of allegedly exchangeable Greeks in Constantinople, who had not obeyed a warning to leave. The Greek government complained to the League of Nations that the Turkish government was usurping the authority of the Mixed Commission. In February 1925, some time after the release of the arrested persons, the Permanent Court of International Justice defined the status of exchangeability in a sense favorable to Greek claims.²³

2. On January 30, 1925 the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church was expelled from Turkey. Although he was personally "exchangeable," the Greek government protested, inasmuch as a promise had been given at Lausanne that the Patriarchate would be permitted to remain in its historic seat at Constantinople. Greece appealed to the League, while Turkey denied that the League had any jurisdiction in the matter. In the end a compromise was reached by direct negotiation.²⁴

3. Since less than half a million Moslems were deported from Greece to Turkey under the 1923 convention, while three times as many Greeks deported from Turkey arrived to take their place, the Greek government was hard put to it to find land upon which to settle the incoming refugees. In some cases property of non-exchangeable Moslems in Western Thrace was requisitioned for the use of Greek immigrants.²⁵ Turkey protested this action, and complained of Greek persecution of Moslems in this region. In March 1925 instructions were given by the League Council to the neutral members of the Mixed Commission to investigate the position of

22. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XXXII, p. 76.
23. Permanent Court of International Justice, *Annual Report, 1922-1925*, p. 226-30.

24. For terms of the compromise, cf. Elizabeth P. MacCallum, *The Near East, A Survey of Political Trends in 1925* (New York, Foreign Policy Association, March 1926), p. 24-25.

25. League of Nations, *Greek Refugee Settlement* (Geneva, 1926), p. 126-27. According to this report, half the landed property owned by the local population of Western Thrace was requisitioned by the Greek government to assist 20,000 families from Eastern (or Turkish) Thrace. To the former owners were returned later on all but 14,000 houses and 100,000 stremmas (24,710 acres) of cultivable land included in large estates.

Moslems in Western Thrace and of Greeks in Constantinople.²⁶

4. Additional ill-feeling grew out of the non-application of two separate Greco-Turkish agreements concluded on June 21, 1925 and December 1, 1926 respectively. The first would have permitted "established" Greeks who had fled from Constantinople during the troubled period to return—a provision to which the Turkish government had been strongly opposed hitherto; it would also have compelled the Greek government to purchase all Turkish property sequestered for the use of refugees in Western Thrace. The second agreement attempted a different method of settlement. It provided for the return of sequestered properties to their former owners, rather than for their purchase by Greece. It specified also that Greece, in order to meet its financial obligations to Turkey arising out of the exchange of properties, should set aside £500,000 of the Greek revenues controlled by the International Finance Commission.²⁷

Out of the 1926 agreement there developed a dispute as to the right of governments to submit differences of opinion to the Greco-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal created under the Treaty of Lausanne. The Permanent Court of International Justice was once more appealed to. On August 28, 1928 it rendered an advisory opinion to the effect that governments were not competent—as Greece had contended—to decide what matters should be referred to the arbitral tribunal, but only the Mixed Commission.²⁸

5. Meanwhile a dispute arose in 1926 concerning the activities of the Greco-Turkish Boundary Delimitation Commission which led the Greek government to appeal to the League of Nations. It hoped for an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice which would prevent an island in the Maritsa River from being awarded to Turkey. The Turkish government maintained that only the Mixed Delimitation Commission appointed under the Treaty of Lausanne had jurisdiction in the matter. The League Council, after consulting judicial authorities, referred the dispute back to the Delimitation Commission, and a protocol for the delimitation of the boundary was signed on November 6, 1926.²⁹

Italy Seeks a Rapprochement Between Greece and Turkey

In 1928 a new element was injected into the Greco-Turkish situation. Italy, which only a few years before had been an enemy

26. League of Nations, *Minutes of the Thirty-Third Session of the Council*, p. 462-63.

27. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. LXVIII, p. 13-35.

28. Permanent Court of International Justice, *Fifth Annual Report (1928-1929)*, p. 227-35; League of Nations, *Minutes of the Fiftieth Session of the Council*, p. 867; *Minutes of the Fifty-First Session of the Council*, p. 1487.

29. League of Nations, *Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Session of the Council*, p. 511-16 and 529-30; also *Post-War Treaties Affecting the Near East*, cited, p. 255.

of both Greece and Turkey,³⁰ now launched forth upon a program of reconciliation intended to lead to a tripartite treaty of friendship and arbitration among Italy, Greece and Turkey. This program Signor Mussolini discussed at Milan in the spring of 1928 with the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, then on their way home after a session of the Preparatory Disarmament Conference at Geneva. But although Italy concluded a treaty of neutrality, conciliation and judicial settlement with Turkey on May 30, 1928 and a treaty of friendship, conciliation and judicial settlement with Greece on September 23 of the same year,³¹ Greece and Turkey still found it impossible to compose their differences, and a tripartite agreement was therefore postponed.

Disputes within the Mixed Commission brought to nothing all the current talk of a Greco-Turkish arbitration treaty and naval limitation agreement.³² Turkey renewed its charges regarding Greek oppression of Moslem minorities in Western Thrace and a twenty-day investigation was conducted in the region by the Mixed Commission, only the Turkish member of which supported the Turkish charges.³³ In March 1929 it was reported in the press that Turkish authorities had seized a number of Greek properties in Constantinople in the hope of forcing the Greek government to pay for Moslem properties seized in Western Thrace.³⁴ Tension increased and rumors of impending war were rife in both countries. With the work of repairing the cruiser *Yavouz* almost completed, Turkey placed an order with Italy for two destroyers, two submarines and four scouting vessels.³⁵ The Greek Chamber of Deputies regarded this as a challenge, which it met by voting to acquire two new destroyers and to allow the completion of the battle

30. For the Italian occupation of the Greek island of Corfu in 1923, cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (London, Oxford University Press, 1925), p. 348-56. For the threatened occupation of Turkish territory by Italy, cf. "Survey of Political Trends in the Near East, 1926," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. II, No. 26, March 2, 1927, p. 331.

31. Text of both in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1928* (London, Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 122, 148.

32. Elizabeth P. MacCallum, "The Near East in 1928," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. V, No. 4, May 1, 1929, p. 76.

33. *Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 1929.

34. *New York Times*, March 29, 1929; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 4, 1929.

35. *New York Herald Tribune*, June 9, 1929. Fulfillment of the *Yavouz* contract, signed in 1927, had been delayed owing to an irregularity in the method by which it had been granted, and an investigation of the Ministry of Marine which followed (*New York Times*, December 27, 1927).

cruiser *Salamis*, whose purchase it had formerly hoped to avoid despite an existing contract.³⁶ It was proposed about this time that a joint conference be held to search for a formula on the basis of which the non-application of the accords of 1925 and 1926 might be investigated and remedied.³⁷ But in the atmosphere prevailing even this relatively modest project failed to survive.

Greco-Turkish Agreements of 1930

Early in 1930, with the public declaration of M. Venizelos that he believed Turkey's policy to be a non-aggressive one, Greco-Turkish relations suddenly began to improve.³⁸ Soon afterward the Turkish Minister at Athens and his staff participated in the centennial celebration of the winning of Greek independence (March 1930). Continued negotiations led to the signing of a convention at Angora on June 10, 1930, in which a final settlement was reached on all remaining problems—despite the vigorous protests of the Greek refugees from Turkey, who desired more liberal compensation than the convention accorded them.³⁹

The June convention prepared the way for a general treaty between the two countries. At the end of October 1930 M. Venizelos and Foreign Minister Michalakopoulos were received cordially in the Turkish capital, where they signed a treaty of friendship, neutrality, conciliation and arbitration, a protocol for naval limitation, and a treaty of commerce and navigation.⁴⁰ Thanks were telegraphed from Angora to Signor Mussolini for the

36. Cf. dispatches in *New York Times*, March 29 and May 5, 20 and 28, 1929; also *Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, May 29 and October 24, 1929. The *Salamis* had been ordered from Germany before the war, and Germany wished to deliver it. Greece, however, hoped that the Permanent Court of International Justice would interpret certain clauses of the Versailles Treaty so as to permit it to avoid the purchase. The League Council advised Greece, however, to allow the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to assume the initiative in appealing for an interpretation of the clauses concerned. Cf. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, October 1927, p. 1475; *Minutes of the Forty-Eighth Session of the Council*, p. 178-81.

37. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 9 and 30, and September 14 and 23, 1929.

38. *New York Times*, February 16, 1930.

39. A few special features of this convention were as follows: (a) Within a month the Greek government would place £425,000 at the disposal of the Mixed Commission, of which £125,000 would go to the Turkish government and £300,000 as indemnity to "established" Greeks in Constantinople, Moslems of Western Thrace and Moslem emigrants whose property remained in the possession of Greece. (b) Non-exchangeable Greeks who left Constantinople on Ottoman Imperial passports would not be allowed re-entry; others might return. (c) The Mixed Commission would have power to determine nationality in disputed cases. (d) Remaining property claims would be liquidated within six months, involving a considerable speeding-up of processes. (Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, October 11, 1930, p. 1478-81.)

40. Text of first two in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, December 20, 1930, p. 1837-39. Cf. also William T. Stone, "The Draft Treaty for the Disarmament Conference," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. VI, No. 25, February 18, 1931, p. 480-81.

part he had played in bringing the two countries together.

Informal discussions of a project to extend the Greco-Turkish treaty to Bulgaria were undertaken at Geneva, between meetings of the 1930 Preparatory Disarmament Conference. Turkey had concluded a treaty of neutrality, non-aggression and arbitration with Bulgaria on March 6, 1929;⁴¹ accordingly, after the Greco-Turkish treaty was signed, Angora felt itself in a position to mediate between Athens and Sofia.

GRECO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

Greco-Bulgarian relations since the World War have been troubled by territorial, financial and economic misunderstandings, the earlier phases of which have been outlined already in "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation."⁴² Many of these difficulties arose from the fact that by the peace settlement of 1919 Bulgaria lost the territory of Western Thrace which it had acquired by the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest;⁴³ its only consolation was an assurance in the Neuilly Treaty⁴⁴ that it would enjoy economic outlets on the Aegean Sea under conditions to be determined later. Although the subject has been discussed at intervals, these conditions have not been determined yet, inasmuch as Greece has been unwilling to meet the minimum demands put forward by Bulgaria. Greek statesmen have often suggested a free zone in the port of Salonika for the use of Bulgaria; Bulgaria, however, has always preferred an outlet at Dedeaghatch in Western Thrace, since the latter is linked by railroad with Sofia. Bulgaria has wished also to control that portion of the railroad which traverses Greek territory between Dedeaghatch and the Bulgarian frontier, but this demand the Greeks have refused.⁴⁵

41. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 15, 1929. This treaty was preceded by two other Turco-Bulgarian agreements—a treaty of friendship in October 1925 and a treaty of commerce in February 1928. The latter was denounced by Turkey on December 3, 1929. *Bulletin de l'Institut Intermédiaire International*, April 1930, p. 350.

42. F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. IV, No. 12, cited, p. 253, 256, 259.

43. Cf. maps showing territorial changes in Bulgaria since 1878 in *Isaiah Bowman*, *The New World: Problems in Political Geography* (Yonkers, World Book Company, 1928), p. 382.

44. Article 48.

45. For the rejection of Bulgarian claims put forward at the Lausanne Conference, cf. Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923* (Cmd. 1814, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1923); also William Miller, "Greece and Her People," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1931, p. 492.

Population Movements Cause Serious Trouble

A source of serious trouble for years after the Paris Peace Conference was the movement of dissatisfied populations between the two countries. In 1919 a Greco-Bulgarian convention for reciprocal voluntary emigration was signed at Neuilly to facilitate the migration of persons or communities dissatisfied with the post-war boundary changes.⁴⁶ This instrument proved insufficient, however, to meet the actual difficulties that arose, especially when the unforeseen influx of Greek refugees from Turkey began. The great majority of Greek refugees had to be settled in Western Thrace and Greek Macedonia, and to make room for the newcomers the Greek government soon began to deport Bulgarians from Western Thrace. The Bulgarian government submitted an appeal against this action under Article 11 of the Covenant,⁴⁷ and the statements of both parties were heard by the League Council in April 1923.⁴⁸

In 1923 and 1924 a number of unpleasant incidents occurred in the neighborhood of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. Often Bulgarian families fled precipitately from Western Thrace of their own accord as soon as Greek refugees from Turkish territory arrived in their communities. When safely across the border in Southern Bulgaria, they sometimes found satisfaction for their own misfortunes in molesting members of the local Greek minority. Occurrences of this sort were frequent enough to cause an investigation by the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Commission on reciprocal emigration. The assassination of the mayor of the Greek town of Vodena in July 1924, moreover, caused an official Greek protest to be made to the Bulgarian government. On the same day a Greek officer massacred thirteen of a band of twenty-seven Bulgarian peasants whom he had under escort. This caused a

46. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. I:1, p. 68. This convention provided, among other things, for a Mixed Commission to supervise and facilitate emigration.

47. This article asserts the right of League members to bring to the attention of the Council or Assembly "any circumstance . . . which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

48. League of Nations, *Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Council*, p. 561-64, 578-80 and 642-44. The Greek government arranged for the gradual repatriation of such deportees as might wish to return, while Greek refugees were evacuated progressively from Bulgarian properties. Greece also provided a fund for compensation of Bulgarians who had been disturbed.

panic in neighboring Bulgarian communities and led to exchanges of sharp notes between the two governments and an aggravation of the existing spirit of mutual hostility.⁴⁹

League Intervention in 1924 and 1925

The situation created by these incidents was so serious that outside mediators intervened at Geneva in September 1924 and persuaded the Greek and Bulgarian representatives to sign separate protocols permitting the League to assist their respective governments to execute the Greek Minorities Treaty (effective August 1924) and the minority provisions of the Neuilly Treaty of 1919. Under the terms of the 1924 protocols two League commissioners thereupon examined the situation on both sides of the boundary and presented memoranda to the two governments suggesting the manner in which they might most effectively fulfill their treaty obligations. The Bulgarian government ratified the Bulgarian protocol⁵⁰ and accepted the memorandum of the League commissioners. The Greek government, however, refused the commissioners' memorandum, and in February 1925 secured rejection by the National Assembly of the September minorities protocol itself,⁵¹ partly on the ground that outside intervention might have unfortunate results. The Chamber promised legislation to provide special educational and religious privileges for Bulgarian communities, and gave guarantees that the Greek minority treaty would be fulfilled. Similar assurances were given to the League Council.

Until the autumn of 1925 Greco-Bulgarian relations continued to be extremely difficult. In October occurred the famous frontier incident near Petrich, which resulted in immediate intervention by the League Council to avert a declaration of war following the occupation of Bulgarian territory by Greek troops.⁵² One of the results of League intervention was the assessment of responsibility for the incident and the fixing of an indemnity of \$225,000 to be paid by Greece

49. This description of Greco-Bulgarian relations is in part a résumé of an excellent detailed study of the subject published in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. II, p. 288-309 and *ibid.*, 1926, p. 209-22.

50. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XXIX, p. 119.

51. For the pressure brought to bear by Jugoslavia upon Greece to reject this protocol, cf. p. 11.

52. "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation," cited, p. 259.

to Bulgaria.⁵³ More important results, however, were (a) the reorganization of Greek and Bulgarian frontier forces under the direction of two Swedish officers; and (b) an arrangement for a conciliation commission, to which further frontier incidents might be referred when authorities on the spot failed to reach an immediate settlement by direct negotiation.

Commercial and Financial Agreements Signed in 1927

By March 1926, when the Greek and Bulgarian Foreign Ministers next had an opportunity at Geneva to discuss their common problems, refugee and frontier questions had become much less difficult as a result of the League commission's work. Unpleasant incidents did not cease immediately, but those which occurred in 1926 were of a less provocative nature. On February 28, 1927 the two countries signed a provisional commercial convention.⁵⁴ On December 9, 1927 the Kafandaris-Molloff agreement was signed, defining the financial obligations they had each incurred through the reciprocal emigration which took place before December 31, 1924—the time limit specified in the 1919 convention.⁵⁵ Greece, which was required to pay Bulgaria a substantial sum under the terms of the Kafandaris-Molloff accord, failed to ratify the instrument in 1928; but on March 9, 1929 it was registered with the League and went into effect, to the considerable gratification of the Bulgarians.

Misunderstandings Renewed

In 1926, in view of its overwhelming financial difficulties, Bulgaria received a refugee settlement loan from the League of Nations.⁵⁶ Later on, the serious earthquakes of 1928 led the Bulgarian government to request a postponement of its reparation obligations.⁵⁷ This created a stir in Greece, where the view was prevalent that if Bulgarian reparation payments were to be put off, Greece should receive similar treatment regarding payments to Bulgaria under the Kafandaris-Molloff accord. Failing this,

53. The League commission itself, which took a considerable length of time to complete its work, seems to have cost the Bulgarian and Greek governments a sum equivalent to this, the salary of the lowest-paid member being \$1,500 a month. *New York Times*, August 2, 1929.

54. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. LXVIII, p. 60.

55. *Ibid.*, Vol. LXXXVII, p. 199; cf. also p. 10 n. 66.

56. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, cited, p. 209-22.

57. *New York Times*, October 18, November 21, 1928.

Greece wished to receive out of German reparation an amount equivalent to what it would ordinarily have received from Bulgarian reparation.⁵⁸ Bulgaria's needs were partly met, however, by flotation of a stabilization loan of \$27,000,000 in November⁵⁹ and Greece no longer had cause for complaint.⁶⁰

In 1930 the Permanent Court of International Justice had to deal with a series of questions bearing on liquidation of the work of the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Commission on Voluntary Migration. These affected particularly the status of non-migrating communities on either side of the frontier.⁶¹ An advisory opinion of July 31, 1930 indicated a variety of principles according to which these communities should be treated.⁶²

In the same month Athens denounced the Greco-Bulgarian commercial agreement of 1927 in retaliation for an increase in Bulgarian tariff rates. The Bulgarian Minister of Agriculture and certain members of the Bulgarian legislature, who were about to set out on a visit to Greece, immediately showed their displeasure by cancelling the trip.⁶³ The abrogation of the commercial treaty went into effect on February 3, 1931 when maximum tariff rates began to be levied in Greece against Bulgarian goods.⁶⁴

Arbitration Proposed for Outstanding Disputes

When a Greek soldier was killed by Bulgarian frontier guards on February 4, 1931, the British government, supported by the French and Italian governments, seized the opportunity to intervene in the interests of peace. Notes were presented to the authorities in Sofia and Athens urging them to make an immediate effort to settle outstanding disputes, if need be by referring them to a special court of arbitration.⁶⁵ To this suggestion the Greek government wholeheartedly agreed. The Bulgarian govern-

ment, however, did not wish to submit to arbitration certain issues which the Greek government had raised.

Questions disturbing their mutual relations included:

(a) Bulgaria's access to the Aegean Sea; (b) liquidation of belated claims for compensation submitted by several thousand Bulgarian refugees after the time limit specified in the Kafandaris-Molloff accord;⁶⁶ (c) Greek counter-claims for damages done in Western Thrace by Bulgarian soldiers during the war as well as for damages done in 1906 in an anti-Greek riot at Anhjalo on the Black Sea coast; (d) restoration of the right of a Greek company to exploit the Dospat forests in Bulgaria under a pre-war concession, the Bulgarian government having monopolized the forests itself since the war.⁶⁷

The Bulgarian authorities took the view that some of these questions, having been settled already or being at the moment under investigation, could not be submitted to arbitration. Thus, the League Council had recently appointed M. Unden as an arbitrator in the Dospat forests case,⁶⁸ while on September 12, 1924 the Permanent Court of International Justice had rendered a judgment regarding damage claims in Western Thrace;⁶⁹ the Anhjalo incident, too, was considered closed.⁷⁰ In spite of these objections Bulgaria finally consented to submit all outstanding disputes to arbitration, on condition that the cases Bulgaria regarded as being already closed should be submitted to *ad hoc* tribunals rather than to a single court of arbitration.⁷¹

GRECO-JUGOSLAV RELATIONS

For almost a decade the difficulty of establishing a smoothly working system for transit of Jugoslav goods through the Greek port of Salonika on the Aegean was the chief obstacle in the way of a complete understanding between Greece and Jugoslavia.⁷² In November 1922 Greece ratified a 1914 agreement giving Jugoslavia a free zone in

58. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1929, p. 140-41.

59. *New York Times*, November 21, 1928.

60. For terms of the 1930 reparation settlement affecting Bulgaria, cf. Leo Pasvolsky, *Bulgaria's Economic Position* (Washington, The Brookings Institute, 1930), p. 76-88. For Greek settlement, cf. *ibid.*, p. 85 and Harry D. Gideonse, "The Reparation Settlement of 1930," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. VI, No. 5, May 14, 1930.

61. For list of questions submitted, cf. Permanent Court of International Justice, "Questions of the Communities," *Publications of the Court*, Series C, No. 18-I, p. 361.

62. Permanent Court of International Justice, *Publications of the Court*, Series B, No. 17, p. 35-36.

63. *Christian Science Monitor*, July 2, 1930.

64. *New York Times*, February 6, 1931.

65. *Ibid.*, February 8, 1931.

66. *Ibid.*, February 15, 1931. The time limit for reciprocal emigration specified in the original convention of 1919 expired on December 31, 1924. The 1925 League Commission, however, recommended an extension of the time limit because it seemed that official pressure was still causing considerable population movements.

67. *Journal de Genève* January 31, 1931.

68. League of Nations, *Minutes of the Sixty-First Session of the Council*, p. 1527, 1559.

69. Permanent Court of International Justice, *Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice* (1922-1925), p. 180-84. The Greek view was that a supplementary decision was necessary specifying the precise application of general principles enunciated in 1924. Cf. *Journal de Genève*, January 31, 1931.

70. *Il Giornale d'Italia*, February 10, 1931.

71. *Christian Science Monitor*, February 25, 1931.

72. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, cited, p. 165-77.

the port of Salonika; but the Belgrade authorities, partly on account of Serbia's post-war expansion,⁷³ considered the arrangement inadequate and rejected it. On May 10, 1923 a new Salonika convention was signed; this, however, did not go into effect until two years later (March 1925).⁷⁴ Moreover, difficulties soon grew out of its application, since Jugoslavia was dissatisfied with the management of the Greek section of the Salonika-Belgrade railroad, resented the freight rates charged by Greece, and feared that sufficient provision had not been made for expansion of Jugoslav needs in the port itself. Accordingly, during the dictatorship of General Pangalos, a third set of agreements was negotiated (August 1926), including a treaty of alliance and friendship and four conventions concerning transit via Salonika. General Pangalos was later overthrown, however, and the Greek Chamber refused to ratify his agreements with Jugoslavia on the ground that they involved a diminution of the sovereign rights of Greece.⁷⁵ Not until March 17, 1929 was a substitute agreement reached. This took the form of six protocols differing from the Pangalos agreement in the following respects:

- (a) There was to be no enlargement of the Jugoslav free zone at Salonika.
- (b) The Jugoslav free zone was to be used for Jugoslav goods; it was not to be used for the coasting trade nor for international transit.
- (c) The railway from Salonika to the Jugoslav border was to remain under Greek control; instead of appointing a permanent French arbitrator to deal with disputes, a special arbitrator would be named in each separate case that might arise.⁷⁶

The Friendship Treaties of 1913 and 1929

For some time before the conclusion of this agreement the relations of Greece and Jugoslavia were hardly cordial. Toward the end of 1924 League commissioners sent out under the terms of the Greek and Bulgarian

73. The Serb-Croat-Slovene state established after the war included Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, part of Macedonia, and some territory formerly in Styria, Carniola, and Bulgaria.

74. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XXV, p. 442; also *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-1923, p. 340-42.

75. August 1927. Cf. "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation," cited, p. 236-57.

76. For an account of these negotiations, cf. Saint-Brice, "L'accord gréco-serbe," *Correspondance d'Orient*, April 1929, p. 148-54. In April 1930 King Alexander signed a decree for the regulation of the Jugoslav free zone in the port of Salonika. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 24, 1930.

minority protocols, already discussed,⁷⁷ began to draft proposals for the better protection of Greek minorities by the Bulgarian government and of Bulgarian minorities by the Greek government. Jugoslavia was anxious to prevent the classification of Greek Macedonians as "Bulgarians," lest by analogy the inhabitants of Jugoslav Macedonia should be classed as Bulgarians also. The Jugoslav government insisted that these latter were Serbs, and that in consequence they could not claim the special privileges of minorities.⁷⁸ In an effort to impress upon Greece the seriousness of Belgrade's displeasure at the prospect of the League commissioners' success, the Jugoslav government in November 1924 denounced its 1913 treaty of friendship with Greece and stated that it would remain a passive spectator if Bulgaria should attack its southern neighbor in the hope of regaining Western Thrace. As already seen, Greece respected Jugoslav wishes and rejected both the minorities protocol and the suggestions of the commissioners, but this did not restore the defunct Greco-Jugoslav treaty of friendship.

In 1928 M. Venizelos made it clear that his immediate foreign policy was one of reconciliation with Balkan countries. His predecessors in office had already concluded a pact of non-aggression and arbitration with Rumania,⁷⁹ and now negotiations for similar agreements were begun with Italy and Turkey. The Jugoslav authorities, anxious lest Greece should lend itself to Italian plans for encirclement of the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, were diligent in negotiations which led to the 1929 agreement on the Salonika question. Finally, ten days after the signature of the protocols on transit via Salonika, Greece and Jugoslavia concluded a treaty of friendship, conciliation and judicial settlement (March 27, 1929).⁸⁰

BULGARIA, JUGOSLAVIA AND THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

Jugoslavia's relations with Bulgaria have been embittered by the Macedonian problem,

77. Cf. p. 9.

78. For a brief account of the Macedonian problem in relation to Balkan history, cf. F. Schevill, *The History of the Balkan Peninsula* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922).

79. Text reproduced in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, cited, p. 113.

80. Text reproduced in *ibid.*, 1929, p. 130. Ratified February 18, 1930.

generally recognized to be the most dangerous and difficult cause of irritation within the Balkan peninsula today. In the Ottoman period the entire area known as Macedonia was under a single administration, and developed a certain sense of solidarity, especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the slogan of "Macedonia for the Macedonians" became popular during the struggle against Ottoman oppression. By the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, however, Bulgaria acquired a portion of Macedonia, while the remainder was divided between Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria had long considered itself the champion of Macedonian interests. Macedonia had been the heart of the Bulgarian kingdom in the tenth century A.D.; from 1870 until 1912, moreover, Bulgarian teachers and ecclesiastics had been active in disseminating Bulgarian culture in Macedonia, whose inhabitants in many cases had learned to call themselves Bulgarians. Bulgaria had hoped that the World War would result in Macedonian unification; but the 1919 settlement left Macedonia divided into three unequal parts, Jugoslavia receiving the largest, Greece the second largest and Bulgaria a portion even smaller than that which it had acquired under the treaty of Bucharest. Bulgaria has long claimed that Macedonians are to be classed as Bulgars. Serbian authorities, on the other hand, have regarded the Macedonians as Serbs,⁸¹ and have subjected them, accordingly, to an assimilationist policy hotly resented by those Macedonians who still hope for the creation of an independent or autonomous Macedonia under the Bulgarian aegis.

Macedonian Revolutionaries

Raid Jugoslav Frontier

After the peace settlement, many Jugoslav Macedonians fled, as Greek Macedonians had done, into Bulgarian territory. Here some of them, forming *comitaji* bands,⁸² conducted raids into Jugoslav territory to harass the local officials. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (*Imro*), which

from its headquarters in Bulgaria supported and often directed such raids, hoped by this means to hasten the creation of an independent Macedonia. Their tactics, however, had the effect of stiffening the attitude of the Belgrade authorities toward the Macedonian population in Jugoslavia, and brought on the Bulgarian government a series of formal international protests already described, as far as the years 1922-1928 are concerned, in "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation."

In September 1927 a friendly consultation on Jugoslav-Bulgarian problems took place in Geneva between the Jugoslav and Bulgarian Foreign Ministers. The *Imro* immediately encouraged a fresh series of activities by revolutionary bands, since it feared that all prospects for an independent Macedonia would be shattered if Bulgaria and Jugoslavia reached an understanding on the basis of the *status quo*. When a Jugoslav general was assassinated shortly afterward (October 5, 1927), the Jugoslav authorities closed the boundary against all Bulgarians and strengthened the frontier guard. Acting under pressure from Great Britain and France, the Sofia authorities then proclaimed martial law in Bulgarian Macedonia. Violence persisted, however, and the Jugoslav authorities continued to keep the boundary closed until February 1929, when at French suggestion it was reopened.⁸³

The Pirot Conventions

Italian influence was plainly increasing in Bulgaria at the time, and neither Jugoslavia nor France was anxious to let this tendency continue unchecked. Accordingly, arrangements were made for direct negotiations between Bulgarian and Jugoslav representatives, who met in February and March 1929 in the town of Pirot near the common border. Here conventions were drafted for regulation of passports and local frontier traffic and for the creation of a boundary commission to deal directly with border incidents.⁸⁴ A hitch occurred before the conventions were applied, however, inasmuch as the Jugoslav government did not wish to have a boundary commission appointed unless

81. *The History of the Balkan Peninsula*, cited, p. 507. Cf. also Francesca M. Wilson, *Jugoslavian Macedonia* (London, Women's International League, 1930), p. 8.

82. The word *comitaji*, meaning "committeeman," has reference to the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee of Ottoman days. For an account of this period, cf. Kosta Todoroff, "The Macedonian Organization Yesterday and Today," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1928, p. 473-82.

83. *New York Times*, February 6, March 26, 1929.

84. *New York Times*, April 28, 1929; *New York Herald Tribune*, July 31, 1929.

dual properties along the frontier were liquidated⁸⁵ and a military zone ten kilometers deep were created to discourage Macedonian raids.⁸⁶ To this Bulgaria objected that under the terms of the Neuilly Treaty it did not have sufficient troops to patrol the Bulgarian portion of so wide a military zone.

While this disagreement continued, border incidents occurred periodically. In two successive notes to Belgrade, the Bulgarian government complained that Jugoslavia was to blame for the loss of a number of Bulgarian lives; the presence of a boundary commission, it maintained, would probably have discouraged bloodshed.⁸⁷ *Pravda*, a leading Jugoslav daily, suggested on the other hand that Jugoslavia, Rumania and Greece should occupy Western Bulgaria jointly and thereby cut short the perennial difficulties arising from Bulgaria's inability or unwillingness to stamp out Macedonian revolutionary activities.

At Geneva in September 1929 the Jugoslav and Bulgarian Foreign Ministers agreed to the provisional application of the March conventions for three months and their use as a basis for further negotiations.⁸⁸ The Pirot commission reconvened in the same month, and was still in session in March 1930 when a renewed outbreak of unusual violence occurred, including a bombing incident in Pirot itself. The Jugoslav government requested an investigation; accordingly, wholesale arrests of Macedonian suspects began in Sofia and other parts of Bulgaria.

On March 31, 1930 the two governments exchanged ratifications of agreements signed on February 14 to liquidate frontier estates and to maintain security and order along the border.⁸⁹ At the end of November the commission was able to state that almost 4,000 acres of land had changed hands so as to prevent the continued division of some 700 properties, both Jugoslav and Bulgarian. It

85. A great number of Bulgarian and Jugoslav farms had been cut in two when the boundary was traced.

86. *New York Times*, August 1, 1929.

87. *Ibid.*, August 11, 1929.

88. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 7, 1929; *Bulletin de l'Institut Intermédiaire International*, April 1930, p. 350. The latter refers to the adoption on September 26 of specific provisional regulations concerning dual properties, the frontier service, and police measures to facilitate crossing of the frontier.

89. League of Nations, *Registration of Treaties*, May 1930, p. 1. Text of first reproduced in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, December 13, 1930, p. 1805-08.

was expected that the process of liquidation would be completed in 1931.⁹⁰

Bulgaria Launches Attack on Macedonian Agitators

For the rest of the year interest centered on the Bulgarian government's attempt to discourage Macedonian violence. The position of the Sofia authorities was recognized to be delicate. The *Imro* was firmly established in southeastern Bulgaria. Many Macedonians occupied positions of importance in the central government; moreover, Macedonian sympathizers had always been found in the Cabinet itself, while the Ministry of War and the army had never been anti-Macedonian. Under the circumstances, Western European powers decided that the hand of the Bulgarian government might need strengthening, and accordingly Great Britain, France and Italy united in urging Bulgaria to adopt effective measures against the revolutionaries. With this encouragement the Sofia authorities issued a warrant for the arrest of Ivan Mikailoff, the most powerful of the Macedonian revolutionary leaders.⁹¹

A serious feature of Macedonian activity in Bulgaria grew out of a long-standing feud between the followers of General Protogueroft (assassinated in 1928 because he had begun to advocate a *rapprochement* with Jugoslavia) and the followers of Ivan Mikailoff, who had clung to terrorist methods of promoting Macedonian interests. One of the cases of Macedonian violence in March 1930 was the assassination of a surviving Protogueroftist leader, Vassil Poundeff. It was on a charge of premeditated murder in connection with this assassination that the warrant for Mikailoff's arrest was issued on July 18. In November he was tried *in absentia*, being represented by over 200 counsel; the result was an acquittal for lack of evidence that it was actually he who had ordered Poundeff's assassination. The men who performed the deed were sentenced to only fifteen years each, inasmuch as they were found to have acted under compulsion and from fear of the Macedonian revolutionary committee.⁹²

90. *Near East and India*, December 4, 1930, p. 630.

91. *New York Times*, August 17, 1930.

92. *Near East and India*, December 11, 1930, p. 661. In this connection it is interesting to note that General Bakarjeff

This was the first occasion on which any Macedonian had been tried in Bulgaria for offenses in connection with feud murders. During the trial a Protogueroffist witness asserted that his faction had limited itself to seven feud murders, adding that the Mikhalloff group had seventy to its credit.⁹³ Newspapers, however, placed the total of such murders much higher. Killings continued after the Mikhalloff trial, and in December the authorities arrested several members of both factions. In February 1931 Mikhalloff announced, after the kidnapping of two of his rivals, that a fusion of the two parties was at last possible.⁹⁴

**Jugoslav Macedonians
Appeal to the League**

In Jugoslav Macedonia, meanwhile, a constitutionalist movement was growing. Its adherents denounced violence and declared their loyalty to the Belgrade government, but protested against the acts of certain local authorities.⁹⁵

In January 1930 three members of the Jugoslav Macedonian community, without giving previous notice to the Belgrade government, went to Geneva to deliver a petition to the members of the League Council, transmitting it also to the Foreign Ministers of all states which had signed the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, including the United States. The petition was accompanied by memoranda listing oppressive acts and outrages alleged to have been committed by government officials and soldiers in Jugoslav Macedonia. There were also listed the names and addresses of 222 so-called Bulgarians assassinated in this region without trial at the behest of the authorities. A note stated that the total number of "Bulgarians" done away with in this manner had actually numbered several thousand. The League was requested to use its influence to secure the application of the minorities treaties to this region.⁹⁶ A second petition presented

was dismissed from the position of Minister of War on February 2, 1931 for having yielded too readily to Macedonian pressure in a case involving the death of two officers wrongfully accused of having sold Bulgarian and Macedonian secrets to the Jugoslav government. *The Times* (London), February 3, 1931, p. 15.

93. *New York Times*, November 26, 1930.

94. *Ibid.*, February 19, 1931.

95. *Near East and India*, December 25, 1930, p. 711.

96. The Bulgarian government had also pressed this claim upon the League in a communication to the committee appointed in March 1929 to report at the Madrid Council meeting on

on May 9, charged that the earlier one had been used as a pretext for renewed persecutions in Jugoslav Macedonia. Although these petitions were circulated with other League documents,⁹⁷ no action was taken on them by the Council, whose Committee of Three decided that the petitions did not conform to League requirements for admissibility.⁹⁸

ALBANIA

Various aspects of Albanian foreign relations were considered in a former *Information Service* report.⁹⁹ Little needs to be added here. Jugoslavia has continued to regard its neighbor with coolness on account of the predominance of Italian influence under the Treaty of Tirana. Diplomatic relations, broken off in June 1927, were resumed in September 1928,¹ a commercial convention was arranged a few months later,² and an agreement was reached for the establishment of a neutral trade zone along the common frontier similar to that which exists along the Greco-Jugoslav border.³ Mutual charges of attempting to foment uprisings in frontier districts have been made since, however,⁴ and in the summer of 1930 representatives of the Albanian minority in Jugoslavia protested to the League of Nations against the treatment accorded them by their present rulers.⁵

Turkey recalled its Minister from Tirana when Albania was changed from a republic to a monarchy (September 2, 1928), Mustapha Kemal Pasha maintaining that King Zog

procedure with respect to minority petitions. In this memorandum the Bulgarian government referred to the general opinion that the aim of the Peace Treaties was not to destroy the distinctive characteristics of the minorities in any country through assimilation. Bulgaria declared that it would support energetically any proposals which would permit the League Council to determine rapidly the real situation of any minority and insure its protection. It asked the League to establish some strictly impartial criterion to determine when a minority actually existed, and suggested criteria which, if adopted, would have facilitated a decision to class Jugoslav Macedonians as a minority. This letter was published by the League Council with the comments of other governments on the proposed methods of dealing with minority petitions. (*League of Nations, Minutes of the Fifty-Fifth Session of the Council*, p. 1165-66).

97. *Représentation de la minorité nationale bulgare en Yougoslavie: Mémoire présenté au nom de la population bulgare de la Macédoine sous domination Yougoslave* (Geneva, 1930).

98. *New York Times*, April 13, 1930. For reaction in Macedonian revolutionary circles, cf. *La Macédoine* (Geneva), June 27, 1930. Files of this weekly should be consulted for material on Macedonian grievances.

99. "Albania: The Problem of the Adriatic," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 8, June 22, 1927; also "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation," cited.

1. *New York Times*, September 30, 1928.

2. *Ibid.*, April 28, 1929.

3. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 24, 1930.

4. *New York Herald Tribune*, December 28, 1930.

5. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 20, 1930.

had violated his presidential oath when he assumed the crown.⁶ Accordingly, Turkey, in spite of its friendship for Italy, has not yet recognized the Albanian kingdom. Albania retaliated by registering in the name of the king certain Turkish *Waqfs*⁷ whose rents, consequently, have no longer been paid into the estates of the Turkish donors. This action the Turkish government protested.⁸

In 1928 Albania appealed to the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant against Greek policy in respect of Albanian minorities and the liquidation of large Albanian estates under the Greek program of agrarian reform. The League Council decided that a special appeal under Article 11 of the Covenant was unjustified, and suggested that settlement of the questions be left to normal procedure.⁹

RUMANIA

Of Rumania's Balkan neighbors, Jugoslavia is the one with which it has enjoyed the closest relationship, chiefly on account of their common membership in the Little Entente, formed to preserve the territorial settlement of 1919. Their bilateral convention of defensive alliance, signed on June 7, 1921,¹⁰ was renewed successively in 1923, 1926 and 1929, being accompanied on the last occasion by an arbitration treaty among the three members of the Little Entente.¹¹ The existence of this alliance facilitated an early settlement of boundary questions by Jugoslavia and Rumania. In March 1929 a joint commission met at Belgrade to settle the few questions still remaining between them.¹² On August 4, 1930 the two countries signed a temporary trade convention at Sinaia for joint marketing of the 1930 grain crop and for the creation of a customs union to promote commerce between the two states.¹³

With Greece, Rumania has had few disputes. On March 23, 1928 the two countries concluded a treaty of non-aggression, con-

ciliation and arbitration.¹⁴ In 1930 a tariff war began between them, however, which led to the publication of a Rumanian decree prohibiting Greek ships from anchoring in Rumanian harbors.¹⁵ In December 1930 all Greek newspapers were barred from Rumania and the Greek government was requested to prevent continued publication of uncomplimentary articles concerning the Rumanian king. The Greek authorities did not feel, however, that they could comply with the Rumanian request.¹⁶

There has been a lack of warmth in the relations between Rumania and Turkey, largely owing to the difference in their respective attitudes toward Russia, which is a warm friend of Angora while suspected at Bucharest of expansionist designs in Bessarabia. For two years (1928-1930) the Rumanian legation at Angora was left in charge of an honorary attaché, but recently normal representation has been restored.¹⁷

Dobrudja Incidents Disturb Relations with Bulgaria

Insecurity resulting from Bulgarian *comitaji* raids into the Dobrudja, formerly a Bulgarian province, has exercised the Rumanian government from time to time. On several occasions it has associated itself with Jugoslavia, or with Jugoslavia and Greece, in protests to Sofia. The first important occasion was in 1922.¹⁸ Again, after a serious disturbance on the Jugoslav-Bulgarian border on July 23, 1926, Rumania ordered the creation of an 18-mile-wide military zone on its southern border and joined Jugoslavia and Greece in a collective note to Bulgaria on August 11.¹⁹ In September 1929 Rumanian and Jugoslav military planes flew low over Bulgarian territory at a time when border incidents had become frequent. The Bulgarian government, alleging a violation of international law, protested to both the Jugoslav and Rumanian governments.²⁰

Meanwhile, the Sofia authorities protested against the treatment of the Bulgarian

6. *New York Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1930.

7. Pious foundations or religious bequests, part of the rents on which are frequently due, as in these cases, to the heirs of the donor in perpetuity.

8. *New York Times*, January 20, 1929.

9. League of Nations, *Minutes of the Fiftieth Session of the Council*, p. 942-44.

10. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. LIV, p. 257.

11. Rumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

12. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 14, 1929.

13. *L'Europe Nouvelle*, September 13, 1930, p. 1321.

14. Text in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, cited, p. 113.

15. *New York Times*, September 14, 1930.

16. *Ibid.*, December 30, 1930.

17. *Ibid.*, August 10, 1930.

18. Cf. "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation," cited.

19. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, p. 219.

20. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 27, 1929.

minority in the Dobrudja. Lands there had been taken from Bulgarian farmers who had no Turkish title-deeds (i.e., papers dating back to 1878 or earlier)²¹ and given to Rumanian Macedonians—for the most part rough mountaineers—who had been imported into the region on the encouragement of the Bucharest authorities. A bitter racial feud had thus developed. In July 1930 a law for the reorganization of the Dobrudja was greeted in Sofia as a partial attempt on Rumania's part to regulate conditions which by that time had grown extremely difficult;²²

in August a Bulgarian-Rumanian agreement was reached permitting the Bulgarians and Macedonians in the Dobrudja each to maintain three communal schools.²³ Petitions for the general establishment of Bulgarian schools, however, were met by persecution of the persons who signed them; as a result, a further petition was sent to the League in January 1931 asking for restitution of confiscated lands, cessation of colonization in the Dobrudja, permission to open Bulgarian churches and schools, and punishment of officials responsible for the persecutions.²⁴

FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE BALKANS

Since Franco-Italian rivalry in the Balkan peninsula is a subject important enough to merit treatment in a separate *Foreign Policy Report*, references to it here will be of the briefest character. From the time the peace treaties were signed, France found itself in natural sympathy with Jugoslavia and Rumania, since all three were interested in preserving the 1919 territorial settlement. Italy, on the other hand, gained far less by the peace treaties than it believed itself entitled to, and soon manifested a desire to better its position in the Adriatic regions at the expense of Jugoslavia. The latter, however, was in no mood to yield to pressure. Under the circumstances, France naturally gave its moral support to Jugoslavia in the conflicts which ensued between Rome and Belgrade. In evidence of this, France concluded a treaty of friendly understanding with Jugoslavia on November 11, 1927²⁵ and maintained close diplomatic relations with its protégé.

To what has already been recorded concerning the development of the Jugoslav-Italian conflict²⁶ it need only be added here that unpleasant incidents continued after 1928 in Dalmatia and in the Slav communities of northeastern Italy, culminating (a) in Italian charges that Jugoslavia was fomenting *comitaji* activity along the frontier,²⁷

and (b) in suppressed Jugoslav excitement over the Pola and Trieste trials of 1929 and 1930, in which several Italian subjects of Slav origin were condemned to death for participating in disturbances created in the alleged interests of the Slav minority.²⁸ Although in the spring of 1930 Foreign Minister Marinkovitch and Signor Dino Grandi discussed at Geneva the possibility of improving Jugoslav-Italian relations,²⁹ nothing definite was accomplished beyond avoiding a direct clash between the two governments.

ITALY DEVELOPS TREATIES WITH BALKAN STATES

Italy, meanwhile, achieved marked success in building up a system of treaties in the Balkans. The first of its special agreements was a pact of friendship, neutrality and cordial collaboration with Jugoslavia itself, signed on January 27, 1924 during a temporary lull in Jugoslav-Italian hostility.³⁰ Disputes were resumed not long afterward, however, and the treaty was allowed to lapse on January 28, 1929. On September 16, 1926 an Italian-Rumanian pact of friendship and cordial collaboration was concluded.³¹ This was followed on November 27, 1926 by the Treaty of Tirana, in which Italy pledged itself to protect the political, juridical and territorial *status quo* in Albania.³² Next came an Italian-Hungarian treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration on April 5,

21. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, cited, p. 214.

22. *Christian Science Monitor*, July 1, 1930.

23. *Ibid.*, August 16, 1930.

24. *Near East and India*, January 29, 1931, p. 125.

25. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. LXVIII, p. 374.

26. "Albania: The Problem of the Adriatic," and "Obstacles to Balkan Cooperation," cited.

27. *New York Herald Tribune*, May 19, 1929.

28. *New York Times*, October 15, 22, 1929 and September 7, 11, 18, 1930.

29. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 20, 1930.

30. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XXIV, p. 32.

31. *Ibid.*, Vol. LXVII, p. 393.

32. *Ibid.*, Vol. LX, p. 15.

1927.³³ Finally, as already seen, special treaties were made with Turkey and Greece in 1928.³⁴

RIVALRY OF FRANCE AND ITALY IN BULGARIA

Apart from Jugoslavia, Bulgaria was the only Balkan country not included in Italy's special treaty system in 1930. By a number of friendly acts Italy had expressed its cordial attitude toward Bulgaria, however, and had attempted to create an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of closer relations between Rome and Sofia. In August 1928 Italy sharply refused the invitation of France and Great Britain to participate in urging the Bulgarian government to curb Macedonian activities,³⁵ and it was a considerable surprise to Bulgarians when Italy, after some hesitation, cooperated in a similar *démarche* in March 1930.³⁶ In July 1929 an Italian naval and air squadron paid a courtesy visit to Bulgaria, in the course of which General Italo Balbo made a speech at Varna encouraging Bulgaria to renew its claims to Jugoslav Macedonia.³⁷ In the spring of 1930 Bulgaria granted Italy a free harbor at Varna and a virtual monopoly of the automobile trade in all of Bulgaria.³⁸ The growing intimacy of the two governments was generally remarked.

In October 1930 King Boris of Bulgaria married Princess Giovanna of Italy. Although it was generally believed that personal inclination rather than political expediency had occasioned the match, yet in

Jugoslavia the conviction was freely expressed that it would be followed by a reduction of French influence in Bulgaria and a more than proportionate increase of Italian influence.³⁹ In December 1930 leaders of the Bulgarian Peasants' party denounced the Italophile policy of the Liaptcheff government and urged the latter to avoid the dangers inherent in too wide an extension of Italian influence.⁴⁰ Even among members of the government party there were those who would have preferred a policy more favorable to the development of a new friendship between Bulgaria and Jugoslavia.⁴¹

In one important respect Italy was not able to compete with France in Bulgaria, namely in the matter of financial assistance. In spite of the refugee loan of 1926, the stabilization loan of 1928, and the reduction of Bulgarian reparation dues in 1929, the country was still in need of financial assistance which France was in a much better position to give than Italy.⁴²

One of the leading features of recent French policy in the Balkans has been its encouragement of agricultural cooperation, and in this respect Sofia has hoped to benefit from French support. Bulgaria has been one of the countries represented at the majority of the recent agricultural conferences sponsored by France, while Jugoslavia and Rumania have been represented at them all. A study of these agricultural conferences may be presented in a forthcoming *Foreign Policy Report*.

CONCLUSION

Much speculation has gone on as to the probable outcome of the present tendency among Balkan states to contract bilateral treaties of friendship, arbitration and cordial collaboration. Observers are apt to interpret recent developments in one of two ways. One school of thought sees in them evidence of an Italian plan to build up a system of

alliances in the interests of treaty revision. The other school of thought emphasizes the immediate advantages gained as a result of each separate Balkan treaty and believes that Italy's influence with respect to many of them has been overestimated. They point out that the first article of the Greco-Italian

33. *Ibid.*, Vol. LXVII, p. 399.

34. Cf. p. 6 *et seq.*

35. *New York Times*, March 26, 1929.

36. *Ibid.*, March 21, 1930.

37. *Ibid.*, July 9, 1929.

38. *Ibid.*, May 10, 1930.

39. *Near East and India*, November 13, 1930, p. 544.

40. *New York Times*, December 28, 1930.

41. *New York Herald Tribune*, November 9, 1930.

42. On March 10, 1931 an agreement was signed for a French loan to Rumania. (*New York Times*, March 11, 1931). Negotiations were being carried on for a similar loan to Jugoslavia (*ibid.*, February 23, 1931), while a project for a French loan to Italy had just been set on foot. (*Ibid.*, March 3, 1931.)

treaty binds the signatories "to lend each other their aid and cordial collaboration for the maintenance of the settlement created by the Treaty of Peace."⁴³ They believe that Turkey and Greece are far more likely to form an alliance with Bulgaria to secure semi-permanent seats on the League Council in rotation (as is done by the three members of the Little Entente) than they are to lend themselves to a revisionist scheme of Italy and Hungary. It is pointed out that Turkey has an elaborate system of general friendship treaties, which includes European countries opposed to treaty revision as well as those which might support it.⁴⁴ The opinion is advanced, moreover, that Turkey has grown tired of being subjected to alternate pressure from Italy on the one side and Russia on the other, and would be glad to relieve the strain by entering the League of Nations if suitable provisions were made for satisfying Turkish *amour propre* at Geneva.⁴⁵

Greece, too, seems anxious to play an independent rôle. Among the ten friendship and arbitration treaties it has concluded since the beginning of 1928 there are to be found treaties not only with Italy and Hungary, but with Jugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland as well.⁴⁶

After reviewing the recent course of developments in the Balkan peninsula it thus becomes apparent that mutual relations of the six states concerned are much less precarious today than they were eight years ago. The exchange of populations has been practically completed; the single outstanding problem concerning use of seaports—that relating to Dedeaghatch—seems on the way toward regulation; territorial disputes have been settled in almost every case; and provision has been made for effective treatment of frontier incidents. It is also apparent, however, that to establish a normal degree of security in the Balkan peninsula there still remain a number of requirements.

These are the attainment of satisfactory commercial agreements between each pair of states, a general agreement for the promotion of common agricultural and commercial interests, the achievement of sufficient unity to offset the influence of rival foreign states, the protection of minorities in practice as well as in principle, and the settlement of Macedonian claims.

The Macedonian problem is the most difficult one which the Second Balkan Conference will have to face. Bulgarians have been insisting that they will enter no Balkan union organized prior to a satisfactory settlement of the minorities question, and have appointed as delegates to the Second Balkan Conference persons who are expected to take a strong stand on this principle.⁴⁷ The Jugoslav Foreign Minister, on the other hand, has stated that his government will discuss the subject of minorities with no one except those who wish to do it in a friendly and amicable fashion. He has asserted that the history of the Ottoman Empire has shown how easily minority questions may be used by outsiders as a weapon with which to hasten the disintegration of a nation; Jugoslavia, he has implied, will not permit its integrity to be menaced in a similar fashion.⁴⁸

A delicate situation thus faces the committee in charge of preparations for the Second Balkan Conference. If they meet it successfully, they may claim to have made a considerable contribution toward Balkan stabilization. If they fail, however, it is possible, in the opinion of many, that economic and political forces, working more slowly, may ultimately bring about a reconciliation between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria as complete as that which has recently taken place between Greece and Turkey.⁴⁹ Once this has been accomplished, one of the greatest causes of restlessness in the Palkan peninsula will have been removed.

43. Royal Survey of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, cited, p. 148.

44. By 1931 the system of Turkish friendship treaties included Russia and all European League members except Great Britain, Ireland, Lithuania, Belgium and Portugal. Cf. "Post-War Treaties Affecting the Near East: An Index," cited, p. 252-57.

45. *New York Times*, November 30, 1930.

46. For a fuller discussion of the position of Greece, cf. "Greece and Her Neighbors," cited.

47. *New York Times*, March 11, 1931.

48. *Ibid.*, December 18, 1930; *Near East and India*, January 1, 1931, p. 6.

49. The Franco-Italian naval understanding of March 1931, for example, has been cited as a development likely to hasten a *rapprochement* between Jugoslavia, a protégé of France, and Bulgaria, a protégé of Italy.